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Foreword
At the direction of the former Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. James G. Roche, the Air
Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) established the Air Force Center for Systems Engineering
(AF CSE) at its Wright Patterson AFB campus in 2003. With academic oversight by a
subcommittee on Systems Engineering (SE), chaired by then-Air Force Chief Scientist Dr. Alex
Levis, the AF CSE was tasked to develop case studies of SE implementation during concept
definition, acquisition, and sustainment. The committee drafted an initial case outline and
learning objectives, and suggested the use of the Friedman-Sage Framework to guide overall
analysis.
The Department of Defense is exponentially increasing the acquisition of joint complex
systems that deliver needed capabilities demanded by our warfighter. Systems engineering is the
technical and technical management process that focuses explicitly on delivering and sustaining
robust, high-quality, affordable solutions. The Air Force leadership has collectively stated the
need to mature a sound Systems engineering process throughout the Air Force. Gaining an
understanding of the past and distilling learning principles that are then shared with others
through our formal education and practitioner support are critical to achieving continuous
improvement.
The AF CSE has published nine case studies thus far including the A-10, KC-135
Simulator, Global Hawk, C-5A, F-111, Hubble Telescope, Theater Battle Management Core
System, International Space Station and Global Positioning System (GPS). All case studies are
available on the AF CSE website [http://www.afit.edu/cse]. These cases support academic
instruction on SE within military service academies, civilian and military graduate schools,
industry continuing education programs, and those practicing SE in the field. Each of the case
studies is comprised of elements of success as well as examples of SE decisions that, in
hindsight, were not optimal. Both types of elements are useful for learning.
Along with discovering historical facts, we have conducted key interviews with program
managers and chief engineers, both within the government and those working for the prime and
various subcontractors. From this information, we have concluded that the discipline needed to
implement SE and the political and acquisition environment surrounding programs continue to
challenge our ability to provide balanced technical solutions. We look forward to your comments
on this PAVE LOW case study and our other AF CSE published studies.
CAPT TIMOTHY J. DUENING, USN
Acting Director, Air Force Center for Systems Engineering
Air Force Institute of Technology

Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited
The views expressed in this Case Study are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the
United States Government.
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1

Systems Engineering Principles

1.1

General Systems Engineering Process

The Department of Defense continues to develop and acquire joint systems and to deliver
needed capabilities to the warfighter. With a constant objective to improve and mature the
acquisition process, it continues to pursue new and creative methodologies to purchase these
technically complex systems. A sound systems engineering process, focused explicitly on
delivering and sustaining robust, high-quality, affordable products that meet the needs of
customers and stake holders must continue to evolve and mature. Systems engineering is the
technical and technical management process that results in delivered products and systems that
exhibit the best balance of cost and performance. The process must operate effectively with
desired mission-level capabilities, establish system-level requirements, allocate these down to the
lowest level of the design, and ensure validation and verification of performance, meeting cost
and schedule constraints. The systems engineering process changes as the program progresses
from one phase to the next, as do the tools and procedures. The process also changes over the
decades, maturing, expanding, growing, and evolving from the base established during the
conduct of past programs. Systems engineering has a long history. Examples can be found
demonstrating a systemic application of effective engineering and engineering management, as
well as poorly applied, but well-defined processes. Throughout the many decades during which
systems engineering has emerged as a discipline, many practices, processes, heuristics, and tools
have been developed, documented, and applied.
Several core lifecycle stages have surfaced as consistently and continually challenging
during any system program development. First, system development must proceed from a welldeveloped set of requirements. Second, regardless of the evolutionary acquisition approach, the
system requirements must flow down to all subsystems and lower level components. And third,
the system requirements need to be stable, balanced and must properly reflect all activities in all
intended environments. However, system requirements are not unchangeable. As the system
design proceeds, if a requirement or set of requirements is proving excessively expensive to
satisfy, the process must rebalance schedule, cost, and performance by changing or modifying
the requirement or set of requirements.
Systems engineering includes making key system and design trades early in the process
to establish the system architecture. These architectural artifacts can depict any new system,
legacy system, modifications thereto, introduction of new technologies, and overall system-level
behavior and performance. Modeling and simulation are generally employed to organize and
assess architectural alternatives at this introductory stage. System and subsystem design follows
the functional architecture. System architectures are modified if the elements are too risky,
expensive or time-consuming. Both newer object-oriented analysis and design and classic
structured analysis using functional decomposition and information flows/data modeling occurs.
Design proceeds logically using key design reviews, tradeoff analysis, and prototyping to reduce
any high-risk technology areas.
Important to the efficient decomposition and creation of the functional and physical
architectural designs are the management of interfaces and integration of subsystems. This is
applied to subsystems within a system, or across large, complex system of systems. Once a
solution is planned, analyzed, designed, and constructed, validation and verification take place to
1

ensure satisfaction of requirements. Definition of test criteria, measures of effectiveness (MOEs),
and measures of performance (MOPs), established as part of the requirements process, takes
place well before any component/subsystem assembly design and construction occurs.
There are several excellent representations of the systems engineering process presented
in the literature. These depictions present the current state of the art in the maturity and evolution
of the systems engineering process. One can find systems engineering process definitions,
guides, and handbooks from the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE),
Electronic Industries Association (EIA), Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE),
and various Department of Defense (DoD) agencies and organizations. They show the process as
it should be applied by today’s experienced practitioner. One of these processes, long used by the
Defense Acquisition University (DAU), is depicted in Figure 1. It should be noted that this
model is not accomplished in a single pass. This iterative and nested process gets repeated to the
lowest level of definition of the design and its interfaces. Formal models such as these did not
appear until after the HH-53H/MH-53J PAVE LOW III program had finished production, but
many of the processes were already in practice with both the government and contractor
workforces during the time of MH-53M PAVE LOW IV development.

Figure 1. The Systems Engineering Process as Presented by DAU

1.2

DoD Directive 5000 Series

During President Richard Nixon’s first term, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird faced
congressional attempts to lower defense spending. The cause was the Vietnam War and the
rising cost of defense acquisition, as well as emerging energy and environmental programs. Laird
and David Packard, his deputy, recognized the need for a mechanism to control and manage
spending especially with the coming fiscal constraint. In May 1969, Packard formed the Defense
2

Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) to give advice on the acquisition of major
weapon systems. It was chartered to review major milestones as well as conduct occasional
management reviews. One year later in 1970, i Packard issued a policy memorandum that was to
become the foundation for the DoD 5000 series of documents ii which were first issued in 1971,
and as of January 2008 had been reissued 10 times. The original purpose of the DoD 5000 series
was to improve the management of acquisition programs and included policy to streamline
management, decentralize execution, and use appropriate management structures. 1 The 1971
issue of the DoD 5000 series established the following program considerations (abbreviated
here) pertaining to progression of a program through the acquisition process. 2
1. System need shall be clearly established in operational terms, with appropriate limits, and
shall be challenged throughout the acquisition process…Wherever feasible, operational needs
shall be satisfied through the use of existing military or commercial hardware…
2. Cost parameters shall be established which consider the cost of acquisition and ownership…
Practical tradeoffs shall be made between system capability, cost and schedule…
3. Logistic support shall also be considered as a principle design parameter…
4. Programs shall be structured and resources allocated to assure that the demonstration of
actual achievement is the pacing function… Schedules and funding profiles shall be
structured to accommodate unforeseen problems and permit task accomplishment without
unnecessary overlapping or concurrency.
5. Technical uncertainty shall be continually assessed… Models, mock-ups, and system
hardware will be used to the greatest possible extent to increase confidence level.
6. Test and evaluation shall commence as early as possible. A determination of operational
suitability, including logistics support requirements, will be made prior to large scale
production commitments…
7. Contract type shall be consistent with all program characteristics, including risk…
8. The source selection decision shall take into account the contractor’s capability to develop a
necessary defense system on a timely and cost-effective basis…
9. Management information/program control requirements shall provide information which is
essential to effective management control… Documentation shall be generated in the
minimum amount to satisfy necessary and specific management needs.
1.3

Evolving Systems Engineering Process

The DAU model, like all others, has been documented in the last two decades, and has
expanded and developed to reflect a changing environment. Systems are becoming increasingly
complex internally and more interconnected externally. The process used to develop the aircraft

i

1970 was also the year that the MAC ROC 19-70 was issued for the requirement for an “integrated system to
enable a rescue vehicle to perform search and rescue under conditions of total darkness and/or adverse weather in all
geographical areas…” Hence, the Pave Low program was born.

ii

DoD Directive 5000.1 and its accompanying DoD Instruction 5000.2.
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and systems of the past was a process effective at the time. It served the needs of the
practitioners and resulted in many successful systems in our inventory. Notwithstanding, the cost
and schedule performance of the past programs are fraught with examples of some well-managed
programs and ones with less-than-stellar execution. As the nation entered the 1980s and 1990s,
large DoD and commercial acquisitions were overrunning costs and behind schedule. Aerospace
industry primes were becoming larger and more geographically and culturally distributed and
worked diligently to establish common systems engineering practices across their enterprises.
However, these common practices must be understood and be useful both within the enterprise
and across multiple corporations and vendor companies because of the mega-trend of teaming in
large (and some small) programs. It is essential that the systems engineering process affect
integration, balance, allocation, and verification and be useful to the entire program team down
to the design and interface level.
Today, many factors overshadow new acquisition, including system-of-systems (SoS)
context, network-centric warfare and operations, an increased attention to human systems
integration, and the rapid growth in information technology. These factors are driving a more
sophisticated systems engineering process with more complex and capable features, along with
new tools and procedures. One area of increased focus of the systems engineering process is the
informational systems architectural definitions used during system analysis. This process,
described in the DoD Architectural Framework (DoDAF) 3, emphasizes greater reliance on
reusable architectural views describing the system context and concept of operations,
interoperability, information and data flows, and network service-oriented characteristics.
1.4

Case Studies

The systems engineering process to be used in today’s complex system and system-ofsystems projects is a process matured and founded on principles developed in the past.
Examination of systems engineering principles used on programs, both past and present, can
provide a wealth of lessons to be used in applying and understanding today’s process. It was this
thinking that led to the initiation of the Air Force Center for Systems Engineering case study
effort, as well as the present continuation of that effort.
The purpose of developing detailed case studies is to support the teaching of systems
engineering principles. They will facilitate learning by emphasizing to the student the long-term
consequences of the systems engineering and programmatic decisions on program success. The
systems engineering case studies will assist in discussion of both successful and unsuccessful
methodologies, processes, principles, tools, and decision material to assess the outcome of
alternatives at the program/system level. In addition, the importance of using skills from multiple
professions and engineering disciplines and collecting, assessing, and integrating varied
functional data will be emphasized. When they are taken together, the student is provided realworld, detailed examples of how the process attempts to balance cost, schedule, and
performance.
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The utilization and misutilization of systems engineering principles will be highlighted,
with special emphasis on the conditions that foster and impede good systems engineering
practices. Case studies should be used to illustrate both good and bad examples of acquisition
management and learning principles, to include whether:
•

every system provides a satisfactory balanced and effective product to a customer;

•

effective requirements analysis was applied;

•

consistent and rigorous application of systems engineering management standards was
applied;

•

effective test planning was accomplished;

•

there were effective major technical program reviews;

•

continuous risk assessments and management was implemented;

•

there were reliable cost estimates and policies;

•

they used disciplined application of configuration management;

•

a well-defined system boundary was defined;

•

they used disciplined methodologies for complex systems ;

•

human systems integration was accomplished;

•

problem solving incorporated understanding of the system within the larger operational
environment.

The systems engineering process transforms an operational need into a system or system
of systems. Architectural elements of the system are allocated and translated into detailed design
requirements. The systems engineering process, from the identification of the need to the
development and utilization of the product, must continuously integrate and balance the
requirements, cost, and schedule to provide an operationally effective system throughout its life
cycle. Systems engineering case studies highlight the various interfaces and communications to
achieve this balance, which include:
•

The program manager/systems engineering interface between the operational user and
developer (acquirer) essential to translate the needs into the performance requirements for
the system and subsystems.

•

The government/contractor interface essential for the practice of systems engineering to
translate and allocate the performance requirements into detailed requirements.

•

The developer (acquirer)/user interface within the project, essential for the systems
engineering practice of integration and balance.

The systems engineering process must manage risk, both known and unknown, as well as
both internal and external. This objective will specifically capture those external factors and the
impact of these uncontrollable influences, such as actions of Congress, changes in funding, new
instructions/policies, changing stakeholders or user requirements, or contractor and government
staffing levels.
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1.5

Framework for Analysis

The Air Force Center for Systems Engineering case studies present learning principles
specific to each program, but utilize the Friedman-Sage framework4 to organize the assessment
of the application of the systems engineering process. The systems engineering case studies
published by the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) employed the Friedman-Sage
construct and matrix as the baseline assessment tool to evaluate the conduct of the systems
engineering process for the topic program.
The framework and the derived matrix can play an important role in developing case
studies in systems engineering and systems management, especially case studies that involve
systems acquisition. The Friedman-Sage framework is a nine row by three column matrix shown
in Table 2.
Table 1.5-1. A Framework of Key Systems Engineering Concepts and Responsibilities
Concept Domain

Responsibility Domain
1. Contractor
Responsibility

2. Shared
Responsibility

3. Government
Responsibility

A. Requirements Definition and
Management
B. Systems Architecting and
Conceptual Design
C. System and Subsystem Detailed
Design and Implementation
D. Systems and Interface Integration
E. Validation and Verification
F. Deployment and Post
Deployment
G. Life Cycle Support
H. Risk Assessment and
Management
I. System and Program Management

Six of the nine concept domain areas in Table 2 represent phases in the systems engineering
lifecycle:
A. Requirements definition and management
B. Systems architecting and conceptual design
C. System and subsystem detailed design and implementation
D. Systems and interface integration
E. Validation and verification
F. Deployment and post deployment
6

Three of the nine concept areas represent necessary process and systems management support:
G. Life cycle support
H. Risk assessment and management
I. System and program management
While other concepts could have been identified, the Friedman–Sage framework suggests
these nine are the most relevant to systems engineering in that they cover the essential life cycle
processes in systems acquisition and the systems management support in the conduct of the
process. Most other concept areas that were identified during the development of the matrix
appear to be subsets of one of these. The three columns of this two-dimensional framework
represent the responsibilities and perspectives of government and contractor, and the shared
responsibilities between the government and the contractor. In teaching systems engineering in
DoD, there has previously been little distinction between duties and responsibilities of the
government and industry activities. While the government has responsibility in all 9 concept
domains, its primary objective is establishing mission requirements.

Figure 2. Sikorsky MH-53M PAVE LOW IV
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2

PAVE LOW System Description

2.1

Background

The Sikorsky HH/MH-53 iii PAVE LOW series served as long-range Combat Search and
Rescue (CSAR) and Special operations helicopters for the United States Air Force. The series
consisted of advanced and upgraded models of the HH-53B/C Super Jolly Green Giant, which
were derived from the CH-53A Sea Stallion flown by the U.S. Marine Corps. The HH-53B/C
was initially developed to supplement the Sikorsky HH-3E Jolly Green Giant in the CSAR role
during the Vietnam War. After an extensive modification program to provide night/adverse
weather capability, the aircraft was redesignated as the HH-53H PAVE LOW III. Later, after
inheriting an additional role as a Special operations platform, it was redesignated the MH-53H.
Upgrades in mission and defensive equipment for its expanded role produced the MH-53J PAVE
LOW III Enhanced. The last and most advanced variant was the MH-53M PAVE LOW IV.
After 29 years of service, the PAVE LOW fleet was retired in September 2008 and was replaced
primarily by the Boeing MH-47E Special operations variant of the CH-47 Chinook helicopter
flown by the U.S. Army.
Table 2.1-1. Key PAVE LOW Milestones and Events
Year

Milestone/Event

15 Mar 67

First flight of newly-designated HH-53B Super Jolly Green Giant; deliveries began in June

03 Apr 67

PACAF identified requirement for a night recovery system in Southeast Asia Operational
Requirement (SEAOR) No. 114
First two examples of HH-53B arrived in Southeast Asia followed by six more

14 Sep 67
25 Apr 68

Effort initiated to introduce a night rescue capability on the HH-53B in the form of the Limited
Night Recover System (LNRS)

May 68

Contract awarded to Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation for an improved Super Jolly Green Giant, the
HH-53C

30 Aug 68

First HH-53C delivered, featuring more powerful engines, additional armor for flight crew, and
improved radio communications equipment

23 Oct 68

Development Directive No. 231 authorizes Pave Star program, intended to eliminate shortcomings
of LNRS

22 Jun 70

Pave Star cancelled due to cost overruns; Pave Imp program initiated for development of a true
Night Recovery System (NRS)

23 Jul 70

MAC ROC 19-70 entitled "Night/Adverse Weather Rescue System" initiated

Jun 72

TF/TA radar installed in an NRS-equipped HH-53B under PAVE LOW I program

20 Jul 72

PAVE LOW II program authorized to determine baseline data for specifications of an operational
system to fulfill MAC ROC 19-70

iii

The MH-53 variants flown by the Air Force are not to be confused with the MH-53E Sea Dragon flown by the
U.S. Navy for Airborne Mine Countermeasures. Air Force variants primarily conduct overland missions, while
Navy variants serve strictly as maritime platforms.
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Year

Milestone/Event

30 Jan 74

PAVE LOW III program initiated by Program Management Directive (PMD); FLIR sensor and
INS integrated with TF/TA radar and fitted to YHH-53H for testing

22 Feb 74

Teledyne Systems Company registered an official protest against PL III program office concerning
sole-source procurement from a different company

Apr 75

First PL III roll-out scheduled; accident occurred due to faulty wiring

18 Sep 75

Official PL III prototype roll-out ceremony held at WPAFB, OH

Mar 76

Prototype development test and evaluation flight test report issued

29 Apr 77

PMD issued to ASD authorizing procurement and installation of PL III system in eight HH-53C
aircraft; NARF at NAS Pensacola, FL awarded PL III modification/installation contract

23 Aug 77

NARF receives first HH-53C for conversion to PL III configuration

Nov 77

PL III subsystem contracts awarded

13 Mar 79

Roll-out ceremony for first operational PL III aircraft held at NAS Pensacola

Apr 79

First production PAVE LOW enters service with Military Airlift Command (MAC) at Kirtland
AFB, NM for qualification and acceptance testing

31 Jul 79

PL III drawing baseline declared; production flight test plan approved

11 Jan 80

First real-world rescue mission by operational HH-53H took place 15 nm west of Albuquerque
NM

Jan 80

Flight test complete

May 80

PAVE LOW fleet transferred to Tactical Air Command (TAC) in preparation for deployment and
rescue of American hostages in Iran

Jul 81

Flight test report issued

Mar 83

PAVE LOW fleet transferred back to MAC

Jun 85

PMD issued to Warner-Robins Air Logistics Center (WR-ALC) to replace two PL IIIs lost in
training exercises

Jun 86

WR-ALC accepts program transfer; mission design series designator changed from "HH" to "MH"
to reflect the expanded Special operations roles and missions inherited by the PAVE LOW

17 Jul 87

First MH-53J rolled out; externally same--internally upgraded with integrated digital avionics,
upgraded radar and night vision systems, improved secure communications, additional titanium
armor, provisions for an internally-carried 600 gal fuel bladder, and an uprated transmission

17 Jan 91

Four MH-53J PAVE LOW III helicopters from the 20th Special Operations Squadron led two
flights of AH-64A Apaches to make the first strike of the war

1997

MH-53M PAVE LOW IV enhanced threat detection and defense capabilities; modification of 25
aircraft took place in 1999 and 2001

Oct 01

MH-53M aircraft fly long-range Special operations missions into Afghanistan during the first days
of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Mar 03

PAVE LOW aircraft once again fly numerous long-range, high-value missions, this time into Iraq
as Operation Iraqi Freedom begins

26 Sep 08

Final operational combat mission for the PAVE LOW in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom

17 Oct 08

Formal retirement ceremony held at Hurlburt Field, Florida
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2.2

Air Force H-53 Variants 5

Table 2.2-1 Air Force H-53 Variants

Mission

Years of
Service

Remarks

• CH-53A Super Jolly
Green Giant

Special Operations

1966 - 1970

Loaned from U.S. Marine Corps; used for
covert operations in Laos and North Vietnam

• CH-53C Super Jolly
Green Giant

Special Operations
and heavy-lift

1968 - 1990

Replaced CH-53A for covert operations; later
used for heavy-lift operations and training

• HH-53B Super Jolly
Green Giant

Combat Search and
Rescue (CSAR)

1967 – 1990

First operational CSAR variant; fitted with an
in-flight refueling probe, external fuel tanks,
a rescue hoist, and protective armor

• HH-53C Super Jolly
Green Giant

CSAR

1968 – 1990

Improved CSAR variant; fitted with
additional armor, improved communications
gear, and defensive systems

Test Bed

1973 - 1977

Used to test PAVE LOW II/III systems;
served as final PAVE LOW III prototype

• HH-53H PAVE LOW
III

CSAR

1979 - 1986

First operational PAVE LOW variant

• MH-53H PAVE LOW
III

CSAR and Special
Operations

1986 - 1990

Re-designation to denote added Special
Operations role

• MH-53J PAVE LOW
IIIE (Enhanced)

CSAR and Special
Operations

1987 – 2008

Improved variant with integrated digital
avionics, an upgraded transmission, more
powerful engines, and various enhanced
mission and defensive systems

• MH-53M PAVE LOW
IV

CSAR and Special
Operations

1999 - 2008

Upgraded variant with greatly improved
threat detection and defensive systems

• TH-53A

CSAR and Special
Operations Flight
Training

1989 - 2008

MH-53J/M training variant (modified U.S.
Marine Corps CH-53A)

Variant

• YHH-53H Black
Knight

iv

Note 1: The PAVE LOW I system was tested on an operational HH-53B rather than on a prototype aircraft. The
system never reached production or operational service.
Note 2: All Air Force H-53 variants remaining in service after 1990 were converted to the MH-53J PAVE LOW IIIE
configuration, some of which were later upgraded to PAVE LOW IV configuration beginning in 1999.

iv

The Pave Low I system was tested on a standard HH-53B and never saw production or operational service.
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2.3

Specifications: MH-53J PAVE LOW III

General characteristics
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Crew: 6 (two pilots, two flight engineers and two aerial gunners)
Capacity: 32 personnel (55 in alternate configuration)
Length (Fuselage): 67.2 ft
Length (Rotors Turning): 88.25 ft
Height (Overall): 24.9 ft
Main rotor diameter (6 blades): 72.25 ft
Tail rotor diameter (4 blades): 16 ft
Empty weight: 32,000 lb
Max takeoff weight: 46,000 lb (50,000 lb in wartime)
Power plant: 2× General Electric T64-GE-100 turboshaft, 4,330 shaft horsepower (shp)
each

Performance
•
•
•
•

Maximum speed: 170 knots (196 mph)
Cruise speed: 150 kt (173 mph)
Range: 600 nmi - can be extended with in-flight refueling
Service ceiling: 20,400 ft

Figure 3. Sikorsky MH-53J PAVE LOW III 3-View Drawing
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3

The PAVE LOW Story

By nature, the tactics, techniques, and procedures that define Special operations require
the use of highly specialized equipment to execute what are undeniably some of the most daring
and hazardous missions in modern warfare. One such example is the Sikorsky MH-53 PAVE
LOW, arguably the premier Special operations helicopter in the world. Even in the wake of its
withdrawal from service in 2008, the extraordinary performance and unique capabilities it
brought to the battlefield remain second to none. To fully appreciate the impressive capabilities
embodied by the PAVE LOW, one must understand its heritage, the roots of which began during
the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. 6
3.1

The Challenge of Night Rescue

During the Vietnam War, the use of surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery by a
very determined enemy resulted in the loss of thousands of U.S. aircraft. Accordingly, Combat
Search and Rescue (CSAR) forces incurred a heavy workload in recovering downed American
airmen. As the executive agency responsible for CSAR, the Air Force had a need for a dedicated
rescue helicopter to supplement the capable but somewhat limited Sikorsky HH-3E Jolly Green
Giant.
Recognizing the potential of the CH-53A Sea Stallion heavy-lift helicopter which had
entered service with the Marine Corps in September 1966, the Air Force borrowed two Sea
Stallions from the Marine Corps to evaluate them for use in the CSAR role. Consideration of this
aircraft was primarily based on the power, speed, range and internal payload capacity that it
offered. Upon delivery of two Sea Stallions in November and December 1966, Air Force
evaluation of the type was carried out at Eglin AFB, Florida. At the conclusion of a favorable
evaluation, the first flight of the newly-designated HH-53B Super Jolly Green Giant (usually just
shortened to “Super Jolly”) was achieved on March 15, 1967, and deliveries to the Air Force
began in June. Key features incorporated into the B-model included an extendable in-flight
refueling probe, jettisonable auxiliary fuel tanks, a rescue hoist, improved avionics, and
defensive armament. The first two examples reached Southeast Asia on September 14, 1967,
followed by six more over the next few months.

Figure 4. Marine Corps CH-53A

Figure 5. Air Force HH-53B

Operational use of the HH-53B proved successful, but revealed several areas for
improvement which led to the rapid introduction of the HH-53C, the first of which was delivered
on August 30, 1968. The C-model made use of more powerful engines, additional armor for the
flight crew and improved radio communications gear. This improved model of the Super Jolly
Green Giant was rapidly deployed to the Southeast Asia Theater of operations where it proved to
be even more effective in CSAR. Still, despite the impressive capabilities that the HH-53B/C
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brought to bear, it remained deficient in one major area‒ the ability to effectively perform the
mission at night, especially in adverse weather conditions. The Air Force had actually identified
the need for an aircraft capable of performing personnel recovery at night and in all kinds of
weather as early as 1965, even before the HH-53 had entered service.
However, other more pressing needs across the military services took precedence and this
requirement went largely unaddressed for two years. The inherent risks associated with entering
hostile territory by air to recover downed airmen were obvious; attempting to do so at night was
borderline suicidal from a flight safety standpoint. Therefore, CSAR operations were typically
carried out only in daylight hours. Generally speaking, the only exceptions to this were the
precious few occasions when airmen went down in the most benign and relatively risk-free
environments in which the chances of enemy contact were slim. Around-the-clock air operations
resulted in a number of downed aircraft during the hours of darkness, the crews of which were
usually forced to try and evade capture in enemy held territory until a rescue attempt could be
mounted at daybreak. Unfortunately, many of them were unsuccessful and ended up being
captured or killed while waiting for sunrise.
To further complicate matters, the large array of aircraft needed to successfully carry out
and support a rescue mission required extensive planning and coordination among all involved,
including the other military services. Careful orchestration by upper command and control
elements was necessary to deconflict the sheer volume of aircraft using the same airspace.
Furthermore, such missions put an inordinate number of personnel and resources at risk. All of
the aforementioned factors, combined with mounting losses of personnel and aircraft as combat
intensified, made the requirement for a more effective CSAR platform more urgent, leading it to
be spelled out more emphatically in Southeast Asia Operational Requirement (SEAOR) Number
114 dated April 03, 1967. This requirement called for an aircraft capable of penetrating hostile
territory with little or no support, independently locating and retrieving the survivor(s), and
affecting a safe and rapid egress back to friendly territory, all under the cover of darkness in all
kinds of weather. It became time critical that such an aircraft be fielded as quickly as possible.
The demonstrated capability and performance of the HH-53B/C in the CSAR arena during
daytime made it logical to simply modify these aircraft, rather than attempt to develop and
produce a whole new aircraft for the mission.

Figure 6. Early Night Vision Goggles

Figure 7. Infrared view of jeep

Although the need for an all-aspect air rescue capability had existed for decades, it was
only during the years of the Vietnam War that the technology finally came within reach to make
nighttime adverse weather rescue operations by air a reality. Night vision technology was still in
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its infancy, but it was maturing at a steady pace and becoming more commonplace on the
battlefield as the war progressed. Efforts to exploit night vision capability for CSAR resulted in a
number of programs, some of which overlapped and ran concurrently as research proceeded at a
feverish pace. The first effort to introduce a night rescue capability on the HH-53 was initiated
on April 25, 1968, and involved a system known as the Limited Night Recovery System (LNRS).
This system was comprised of a Low Light Level Television (LLLTV) camera, an infrared (IR)
illuminator, a Direct View Device, a Doppler navigation system, a radar altimeter and an
Automatic Approach and Hover Coupler System. Operational testing, which was accomplished
at Eglin AFB, consisted of 96 simulated rescue sorties. Tests clearly demonstrated the system did
indeed provide a limited capability to accomplish night combat aircrew recoveries over a variety
of terrain, and deployment of the system was recommended. Subsequently, incorporation of the
LNRS on a number of HH-53s based in Thailand at Udorn Royal Thailand Air Force Base
(RTAFB) began in November 1969. Two months later, a total of eight aircraft had received the
modification.
Although the LNRS added additional capability to the aircraft, its limitations were
recognized early on and it was acknowledged to be an interim solution. Research continued
toward fulfilling the goal of full night/adverse weather CSAR capability; only six months after
LNRS began, an even more ambitious program was born. Running concurrently with LNRS, the
Pave Star program had been authorized on October 23, 1968, and initiated on December 16 that
year. Its goal was to provide a worldwide, all-weather rescue capability which effectively
eliminated the shortcomings associated with LNRS. However, severe cost overruns resulted in
the cancellation of Pave Star barely eighteen months after it began. As a result, a reduced
program dubbed Pave Imp was initiated on June 22, 1970. It was intended to make use of
improvements derived from the short-lived Pave Star program and incorporate them into a Night
Recovery System (NRS) for the HH-53B/C, hopefully attaining the goals originally set for Pave
Star.
Tests were conducted in 1971 using a modified HH-53C to verify that performance of the
Pave Imp system was at least equal to or better than that of the LNRS. Results were positive and
combat evaluation was subsequently accomplished at Udorn RTAFB during a 90-day period.
Although Pave Imp provided a significant increase to existing night recovery capabilities
and it was recommended that the system continued to be utilized to the fullest extent possible,
the team responsible for evaluating the system made it clear limitations still existed. They
concluded efforts should continue toward developing an unrestricted all-weather night rescue
system.
Barely one month after efforts had begun to establish effective night vision capability
through Pave Imp, a Required Operational Capability (ROC), designated ROC 19-70
Night/Adverse Weather Rescue System, was established on July 23, 1970 (Appendix C). As a
result of this, direction was given in November of that year to evaluate the use of a Forward
Looking Radar (FLR) to provide low-level penetration capability for the HH-53. The FLR would
work in concert with night vision systems to provide CSAR capability in total darkness under
adverse weather conditions in all geographical areas at low level. This program, christened
PAVE LOW, marked the beginning of a revolution in night/adverse weather CSAR capability,
ultimately leading to what would become the pinnacle of combat rescue platforms.
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3.2

The Rise of the PAVE LOW

The need for low-level penetration while performing the CSAR mission was self-evident.
However, it became obvious sole reliance on night vision to perform the task within acceptable
flight safety margins was impractical,
particularly given the heavy pilot
workload, mental stress, and crew fatigue
associated with such demanding flying.
The PAVE LOW program aimed to
integrate an FLR, more specifically
Terrain-Following/Terrain
Avoidance
(TF/TA) radar, into the HH-53. This, in
concert with night vision systems
Figure 9. Lockheed AH-56ACheyenne
developed under Pave Imp, would be used
to attain the desired capabilities. Practical
testing and use of the two systems would
prove their codependence upon the other;
eventually, the two requirements would be
merged, along with other features, into a
single package. The initial test concept
involved installation of a Norden
AN/APQ-141 TF/TA radar system, which
was under development for the Army’s
ongoing Lockheed AH-56 Cheyenne
Figure 8. YHH-53H Black Knight
attack helicopter program.
Sikorsky installed the radar, which was modified to provide manual TF/TA steering data
to the pilot, in an NRS-equipped HH-53B in June 1972 and evaluation was completed six months
later. Results were very encouraging, but since the radar was merely a flight test example versus
a production-ready model, further development costs and program risks to bring this particular
system up to production standards were ultimately deemed too high, so the AN/APQ-141 was
eliminated from consideration in favor of one already in production. Even before evaluation of
the TF/TA radar was completed under the original PAVE LOW program – now referred to as
PAVE LOW I to differentiate between it and the next iteration of the program – PAVE LOW II
(PL II) was proposed on July 20, 1972. It was envisioned as a developmental/production/
modification program which aimed to address three distinct limitations identified in previous
programs: inability to avoid terrain and exposure to hostile radar/sensor-directed threats at low
level; insufficient accuracy in the navigation system to reach the rescue area at low level; and
inability to precisely locate the survivor(s) and hold a hover over his/her position. Again using a
modified HH-53B, these deficiencies were addressed through the installation of a variety of
systems including: a new self-contained navigation system known as a Heading Reference
System using Doppler technology; a Projected Map Display System (PMDS); Flight Director
Instruments; an Electronic Location Finder (ELF); and a Hover Coupler (HC). Research and
Development (R&D) efforts in PL II were initiated to determine baseline data for specifications
of an operational system. The number of modifications made to the aircraft warranted a new
designation and the test aircraft became the YHH-53H, with the “Y” prefix to be dropped on the
eventual operational model. The flight test and evaluation program, which took place in 1973 at
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Edwards AFB, California, demonstrated a significant increase in the ability to perform night
rescue. More specifically, it confirmed the feasibility of integrating all primary systems with the
existing Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) to maintain a hover over personnel equipped
with a survival radio. Although deficiencies were found, evaluators were favorably impressed
and development of a full prototype night rescue system based on those tested under PL II was
recommended. By this time, American forces were being withdrawn from Vietnam, but the
night/adverse weather CSAR requirement remained relevant.
3.3

PAVE LOW II and III – Development of an In-House Prototype

Even before testing and evaluation of the YHH-53H had begun, the Directorate of
Combat Systems (under which the PL II program and all other aircraft weapon systems were
ultimately managed) submitted a development plan in August 1972 which encompassed a total
expenditure of $14.2M for the modification of eight NRS-equipped helicopters to PL II
configuration. These costs were based upon the predicted performance of the system, despite the
fact it had not yet been flown and evaluated as an integrated system. However, program costs
had risen substantially. After completion of the flight test and evaluation program, cost estimates
had escalated to more than $20M, at which the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General David C.
Jones, asked, “Can we do it cheaper?” The gunship SPO at the Aeronautical Systems Division,
Wright-Patterson AFB, which had just completed a successful in-house gunship program, stated
they could develop the system using in-house expertise and off-the-shelf equipment for $3.2M.
Under this revised plan, the next phase in development, dubbed PAVE LOW III (PL III), was
initiated by a PMD on January 30, 1974 (Appendix D).
The AF gave the SPO the nod to transition to PL III development in-house in late 1973
and the PMD was initiated on January 30, 1974. The modification of the PL II prototype to PL
III configuration was begun the following month. The PL III program was modeled heavily on
the AC-130 gunship program. Seven gunships had been modified and sent to Vietnam with
measured success. The gunship program demonstrated that an in-house mod program could
work. The gunship program was winding down in 1973 when its Director, Colonel Ronald W.
Terry, believed his staff could also develop the prototype PAVE LOW helicopter. “It is doubtful
that the PL III program could have been accomplished with any other group of Aeronautical
Systems Division personnel except those that had been in the gunship SPO.” Working closely
with HQ MAC, the PL SPO integrated the TF/TA radar, Inertial Navigation System (INS),
computers, signal generators, map displays, and Attitude Direction Indicators (ADI) into a
prototype helicopter, the YHH-53H. As a result of the successful evaluation of the PL III, a
revised PMD was issued April 29, 1977, authorizing procurement and installation of the PL III
system in eight HH-53Cs. Approval was also given to modify the prototype to production
standards, making a total of nine HH-53H aircraft. All structural modifications and installation of
subsystems and components were carried out at the Naval Air Rework Facility (NARF), Naval
Air Station (NAS) Pensacola, Florida. This was done to mitigate costs and risks in regard to
technical and logistics support.
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The concept of prototyping is not new to systems engineering. However, there are mixed
feelings about prototyping throughout the DoD. (A-10 CS p.4) In particular, these mixed views
center around prototyping in the
competitive phase prior to fullscale development. Competitive
prototyping can help mitigate
technical and life cycle cost risk
by delaying costly commitment
decisions
for
full-scale
development until after the
basic
design
has
been
demonstrated and cost estimates
have matured. (A-10 CS p.4)
Figure 10. General Dynamics YF-16 and Northrop YF-17 Lightweight
The Air Force has had prototype
Fighter prototypes
“fly-offs”
in
previous
developments (e.g., the A-X
program, the Lightweight Fighter [LWF] program, and the Advanced Tactical Fighter [ATF]
program to name a few). The typical downside of this approach is that development costs rise
and schedules lengthen. In the case of the PL III, however, because the development costs were
so high and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force asked if it could be done cheaper (or else cancel
the effort), the Air Force decided to take on the risk of the cost of development based on a
similar successful program (the AC-130 gunship). Also, in the case of the PL III, and later the PL
IV, effective prototyping was accomplished at the subsystem and component level.
One problem recognized by the PL III SPO managers during the development of PL III
was the lack of mission-oriented operational experience within the SPO. The same problem had
been encountered during the AC-130 gunship program. The difficulty was much more noticeable
in the PL program as no Air Force officer in the SPO had experience flying helicopters or any
familiarity with the technology needed to perform a rescue mission. The SPO managers
discussed this problem with the customer, MAC. The SPO wanted someone who would have
adequate rank to be able to effect changes if required within the SPO, and to be able to discuss
problems with decision makers at the HQ MAC level. He needed experience in staff work as
well as an understanding of engineering. He also needed experience in rescue during the
Vietnam War and qualifications as an HH-53 pilot. To meet the needs of the SPO, MAC
assigned Lt Col Frank J. Pehr to Wright-Patterson AFB. Lt Col Pehr, who had years of
experience in HH-53 helicopters and who had been on rescue missions in combat, was very
much an advocate of the PL mission. He assisted in designing the prototype, piloting the aircraft
during flight tests, and evaluating its operational usability. He was also involved in the
production decisions, flew the aircraft during production flight tests, accepted the aircraft for
MAC, became the PL III Training Squadron Commander, and even went on temporary duty to
the Tactical Air Command (TAC) when the aircraft were transferred. “He knew more about the
PL III system than any other operational pilot in the Air Force.”1
The gunship program was winding down in 1973 and its Director, Colonel Terry,
believed his staff could also develop the prototype PL helicopter. The gunship program used
USAF personnel bearing the integrating responsibility for fielding gunship aircraft. This type of
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effort had not been accomplished at WPAFB since World War II and it was extremely high risk.
The gunship SPO was organized slightly differently from the normal ASD SPOs at that time.
The major differences were in the personnel and their responsibilities. There were four groups of
“specialists.” Colonel Terry had a staff of one civilian, one military officer, and a secretary.
There was a test organization of approximately four people who were in charge of flight testing.
There was also a large procurement section and a large engineering section. There were no standalone “managers.” The engineers actually worked as engineering managers and were responsible
for the subsystems and for the logistics problems associated with the subsystems. These gunship
personnel and the model SPO developed by Colonel Terry transitioned to the PAVE LOW
program in late 1973.
The ability to acquire personnel who possess the desired experience and skill sets needed
in the new program can reduce the learning curve and increase the efficiency of the program
office. This was the experience of the newly-formed PAVE LOW SPO at WPAFB as gunship
personnel were able to transition to the PAVE LOW program and bring with them the skill sets
needed to accomplish an in-house weapon system development. Also, the addition of a team
member from the user, MAC, early in the program, ensured customer involvement throughout
the life of the program. This enhanced the usability of the PAVE LOWs for the aircrew.
The PL III program added additional equipment to the PL II. Along with the equipment
installed under PL II, an AN/AAQ-10 Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) sensor and an Inertial
Navigation System (INS) were added to the YHH-53H. The FLIR was selected to replace the
previous LLLTV due to lower costs, smaller size and superior performance. In addition, a new
TF/TA radar system was chosen. In order to perform the rescue mission in a combat
environment, at night, and under adverse weather conditions as described by the MAC ROC, one
of the most important contributing subsystems was the multimode radar (Gambone, 1988).1
During the early planning of the PL III prototype, all DoD radars were thoroughly investigated.
The only system that could fulfill the mission requirements was the Texas Instruments manufactured AN/APQ-126, a multimode TF/TA radar system developed in the early 1970s for
use in the LTV A-7D/E Corsair II fixed-wing attack aircraft, flown by both the Air Force and the
Navy respectively.

Figure 11. LTV A-7E Corsair II (Navy variant)

Figure 12. AN/APQ-126 TF/TA radar

This radar performed all of the basic functions which were required for the PL III,
particularly TF/TA and ground mapping. The radar, however, was designed to operate in the A-7
and to perform its functions within the A-7’s operational high-speed flight envelope. This
performance envelope was, of course, significantly different than that of the HH-53. This caused
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some difficulties for PL III. The PL III needed to have the capability of flying its mission at a
minimum altitude of 200 feet above ground level (AGL). However, the true combat rescue
mission requirements called for the aircraft to fly safely at 100 feet AGL. Since this 100-foot
altitude would be flown in the TF/TA mode, the radar was the primary subsystem to make this
effort successful. In looking at how the A-7s used the radar, it was found that pilots seldom used
the TF/TA mode at all. In addition, when they did use the TF/TA mode, they did not fly below
500 feet AGL. Texas Instruments was reluctant to certify the use of a modified AN/APQ-126 at
100 feet AGL. After some simulations of low-altitude approaches to mountains and other terrain
features, Texas Instruments agreed to modify the radar to fulfill the 100-foot requirement. The
modified version of this system, which became the AN/APQ-158, equipped the PAVE LOW
during its entire service life. The AN/APQ-158 was the only major system to have an organic
depot, namely the NARF at Jacksonville, FL (Appendix E). The digital computer, FLIR, Doppler
radar and Symbol Generator systems were repaired at the manufacturer’s facilities. (Gambone,
1988)1
All of the specialized mission systems in the PAVE LOW were collectively integrated
through a central avionics computer. System design, integration and modification were all
accomplished using “in-house” Air Force personnel, funding and facilities, coupled with off-theshelf subsystems to reduce total acquisition costs. Sixteen months after the program began, the
newly modified aircraft made its First Flight under the PL III program in May 1975. In order to
determine the effectiveness of the systems installed, the YHH- 53H was tested extensively under
a combined Development Test & Evaluation (DT&E) / Initial Operational Test & Evaluation
(IOT&E) program from June 9, 1975 through September 30, 1977. During this time, the test
program was interrupted briefly to accommodate a formal roll-out ceremony on September 18,
1975, at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, home of the Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD) which
oversaw the PAVE LOW program. A crucial aspect of the evaluation involved testing in a
number of environments with experienced operational flight crews under realistic mission
profiles. One of the locations selected for this was Kirtland AFB, New Mexico. During testing
there, one crew was unexpectedly afforded an opportunity for a real-world rescue when they
heard radio traffic regarding the crash of an HH-3 in a canyon located south of the base.
Departing the test range, they used their on-board systems to race to the area and locate the
downed helicopter and its crew within ten minutes.
At the conclusion of the evaluation,
not only were all major objectives
accomplished, but the final results were very
impressive.
All
crewmembers
who
participated in the evaluation indicated
unequivocally that the PL III system provided
the first true capability to accomplish the
CSAR mission under conditions of total
darkness
and
marginal
weather.
Recommendations for improvement were
made, however, regarding the equipment used
to pinpoint and positively identify the
survivor(s) on the ground. Nevertheless, the
system had demonstrated an unprecedented

Figure 13. Nighttime view of Pave Low
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ability to accomplish what had been virtually impossible less than a decade earlier. As a result of
the successful evaluation of the PL III, a revised PMD was issued on April 29, 1977, (Appendix
F) authorizing procurement and installation of the PL III system in eight HH-53C aircraft.
Approval was also given to modify the prototype to production configuration, making a total of 9
HH-53H aircraft.
An RFP was sent out and contractors placed bids on the production program. However,
the winner’s bid, submitted by Sikorsky Aircraft, far exceeded the budget. The Naval Air
Rework Facility (NARF) at Naval Air Station (NAS) Pensacola, Florida submitted a competitor
proposal. Shortly thereafter, PL SPO personnel visited the NARF and met with Navy personnel.
It was decided that the NARF could perform the PL III modifications and all structural
modifications and installation of subsystems were carried out at the facility. This was done to
reduce costs and risks in regard to technical and logistics support since all major overhauls and
depot maintenance on H-53 helicopters throughout the military services were already being
performed there. There were several advantages to this arrangement. Since the NARF was a DoD
activity, the PL III SPO did not have to participate in the usual contractual exercises so that the
effort was significantly reduced in scope. Unlike many Government-contractor joint efforts, the
relationship between the SPO and the NARF was very cordial and non-adversarial. The NARF
personnel were expert craftsmen in the fabrication and installation of aircraft parts. If any
activity was left out of the contract, it was never a major problem to get the work done.
(Gambone, 1988)1
The NARF received its first HH-53C
for conversion on August 23, 1977. Nineteen
months later, on March 13, 1979, a formal
ceremony was held at NAS Pensacola during
which the first operational PL III helicopter
was rolled out in front of an enthusiastic crowd
of distinguished military and civilian
personnel. At the time, the aircraft had been
given the unofficial moniker “Black Knight,” a
name coined by personnel in the Specialized
System Program Office at ASD which
managed the PAVE LOW program. They had
Figure 14. Head-on view of HH-53H Pave Low III
picked it as a reference to their legacy of work
in years past on other nighttime-oriented military aircraft, such as the Lockheed AC-130 Spectre
fixed-wing gunship. Additionally, the original test aircraft for PL II and III, wearing an overall
flat black paint scheme, had been adorned with an emblem consisting of a chess knight centered
within a white circle. However, the Air Force never adopted the name or the symbol, nor did it
ever bestow an official nickname upon the aircraft. Although the PAVE LOW name technically
referred to the specialized systems installed on-board the HH-53, the term soon became
synonymous with the aircraft itself. As modification of each airframe was completed, the
helicopters were delivered to Military Airlift Command (MAC) for qualification and acceptance
testing, beginning in April 1979. From there, the PL III entered service at Kirtland AFB. The
total number of HH-53H PAVE LOWs to enter service was eleven, nine of which were
converted from a mix of HH-53B/Cs, and additional rebuilt CH-53Cs.
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While at Kirtland, the first real world rescue mission to be flown by an operational HH53H took place on January 11, 1980, approximately 15 nm west of Albuquerque. The successful
response to a privately-owned light aircraft which crashed in adverse weather at night marked the
first use of an operational PL III helicopter. Although this mission took place in peacetime, the
potential for a combat mission surfaced only a few months later. World events made the mission
assignment to MAC short-lived, as the ongoing Iran hostage crisis prompted the Air Force to
transfer all PL III aircraft and resources to Tactical Air Command (TAC) in May 1980 and move
all PL helicopters to Hurlburt Field, FL. After the failed attempt to rescue the hostages only a
month earlier under Operation Eagle Claw, leaders had considered use of the PL III in a second
rescue attempt. However, a second attempt proved unnecessary as the hostages were released
before a second operation could be implemented. Nevertheless, the functionality of the PAVE
LOW system had been proven and the Air Force had finally attained a much-needed capability.
3.4

Expanding Missions and Capabilities

Consideration of the PAVE LOW for rescuing the American citizens held captive in Iran
highlighted a new role for which the aircraft was ideally suited. The ability of the PAVE LOW to
covertly penetrate hostile territory at high-speed, low-level, and long range had natural
applications in support of Special Operations Forces. Recognizing this, the decision was made to
expand the HH-53 mission to include infiltration/exfiltration and resupply of friendly forces deep
within enemy-held territory. The PAVE LOW offered a degree of flexibility to the Special
operations mission which was unmatched by fixed-wing aircraft. Its ability to take off and land
virtually anywhere provided tacticians and planners a number of options which were previously
unavailable. In essence, the PAVE LOW would become a true Special operations asset,
extending well beyond the original CSAR mission requirement developed nearly two decades
before. Accordingly, the mission design series designator was changed in 1986 from “HH” to
“MH” to reflect the expanded roles and missions inherited by the PAVE LOW. The increased
emphasis on Special operations justified further upgrades in mission equipment, which were
initiated under the Constant Green program that same year. In the meantime, the MH-53H
became fully immersed in the shadowy world of Special operations, leading it to become the first
Air Force helicopter to be fully cleared for operation with Night Vision Goggles (NVGs). As
each MH-53H underwent modification, it emerged as an MH-53J PAVE LOW III Enhanced.
Externally, the MH-53J was almost indistinguishable from the H-model, as most of the changes
were internal. Features introduced with the J-model included integrated digital avionics,
upgraded radar and night vision systems, improved secure communications, additional titanium
armor, provisions for an internally-carried 600 gal fuel bladder, and an uprated transmission. In
addition, more powerful engines were introduced in the form of 4,330 shp General Electric T64GE-100 turboshaft engines (replacing the 3,936 shp T64-GE-7A previously used). The first MH53J was rolled out on July 17, 1987 at the Naval Aviation Depot (formerly NARF) at NAS
Pensacola, achieving Full Operational Capability (FOC) at Hurlburt Field, Florida in 1988.

21

3.4.1 The Importance of Good Configuration Control
In 1987, it became obvious the
configuration control for the PAVE LOW
production program was a failure and
something needed to be done. The Air
Force was trying to upgrade five aircraft
through the NARF simultaneously. The
HH-53Bs, Cs, and Hs, 41 aircraft in total
had 12 different configurations going into
the NARF depot. Initially, it was
discovered there were poor or no records
on the current configuration of each
aircraft undergoing modification. In order
to ensure some level of configuration
Figure 15. MH-53J inserts Special Operations Forces
control, it was decided to do an audit of
each aircraft first. The NARF was trying
to do commodity modifications on aircraft that were all different. ARINC was hired to perform
configuration control. ARINC developed a system for tracking each PAVE LOW by tail number
and documented the modifications to each aircraft as they passed through the depot. ARINC
developed a “waterfall” flowchart for configuration control of all modifications to the aircraft.
This greatly streamlined the process and saved the program time, reduced risk, and cost.
Training for PAVE LOW pilots and aircrew members was accomplished using a fleet of
five TH-53As, all of which were converted Sea Stallions acquired from the Marine Corps in
1989. By 1990, all remaining MH-53Hs had been upgraded to MH-53J standard, with an
additional thirty-one examples being added to the inventory by way of converted HH-53Bs,
HH-53Cs, and CH-53Cs. That same year, in a move designed to better align the MH-53J with its
new multifaceted mission, all PAVE LOWs were transferred to the newly-formed Air Force
Special Operations Command (AFSOC).
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3.5

Suited to the Task

The basic design of the H-53 proved more than adequate for adaptation to the CSAR and
Special operations missions. The twin T64-GE-100 engines provided an abundance of power to
the 72.25 ft diameter six-bladed main rotor and
the 16 ft diameter four-bladed tail rotor. In
addition, the dual engine arrangement provided
an added margin of safety over single-engine
designs. The spacious cabin could accommodate
up to 32 personnel or a variety of cargo,
depending on the mission, while the hydraulically
operated rear ramp made onloading and
offloading of cargo, equipment and personnel a
quick and easy task. The retractable tricycle
landing gear configuration facilitated easy taxiing
and ground handling. Large cambered sponsons
Figure 17. Nose-mounted sensor package
on either side of the lower fuselage housed
additional internal fuel. These sponsons were fitted with cantilever fairings known as “gull
wings,” which served as attachment points for externally mounted 650 gal auxiliary fuel tanks,
collectively providing an unrefueled range of
about 600 nm. If necessary, the range and
endurance could be extended even further by
use of an extendable in-flight refueling probe
fitted on the starboard side of the nose. An
automatic hydraulically-actuated blade-folding
system for the main rotor and a folding tail
pylon, both of which were retrofitted beginning
in the early 1990s, facilitated stowage and
handling when transporting the PAVE LOW
aboard a Lockheed C-5 Galaxy or Boeing C-17
Figure 16. MH-53 being loaded onto a C-5B Galaxy
Globemaster III.
Despite its large size, the PAVE LOW was incredibly fast and maneuverable, with a top
speed of 170 kt. Its ability to perform nap-of-the-earth (NOE) flight in rolling and mountainous
terrain, day or night, in any weather, was made possible not
only by its advanced sensor suite, but also by its inherent
agility. Pilots would typically fly as low as 50 ft over the
highest obstacle in order to avoid detection on radar and to
minimize exposure of the aircraft to enemy air defenses, a
technique known as terrain masking. Despite a gross weight
of up to 50,000 lb, the PAVE LOW’s robust construction
and more-than-adequate power margins allowed pilots to
enjoy a virtually unrestricted flight profile. In addition to
aggressive low-level flying tactics, a variety of on-board
equipment and systems served to protect the PAVE LOW
Figure 18. MH-53J maneuvers at
from the inevitable dangers lurking in hostile territory. To
low-level, high speed
defend against threats at the objective, any combination of
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three GAU-2B/A 7.62 mm miniguns or GAU-18/A .50 cal machine guns were mounted one each
in the port window, starboard crew door and rear ramp. Chaff and flare dispensers were mounted
at various points on the airframe and AN/ALQ-157 IR jammers were placed strategically on top
of each gull wing to defeat incoming heat-seeking missiles. In addition, a comprehensive
Electronic Warfare (EW) suite was fitted to counter other threats. Even with the vast array of
sophisticated on-board systems and sensors, close and continuous crew coordination was
absolutely essential in PAVE LOW operations. In the early days of the PAVE LOW I test
program, twenty-five experienced HH-53 pilots were interviewed as part of a 10-month study to
identify operational CSAR problems relating to cockpit controls, displays and crew station areas.
Results of this study were assessed to determine their impact on operational mission
effectiveness. Since that time, crew coordination and training was perfected to a synergistic level
in which crews placed total trust in one another in order to survive and accomplish the mission.
While pilots concentrated on flying and navigating to and from the objective, they relied heavily
on the lead flight engineer – seated between and slightly behind them – to monitor aircraft and
system performance throughout the mission. When approaching the objective and once on-scene,
a second flight engineer would swap between operating the 600 lb capacity rescue hoist and
providing defensive fire suppression from his position in the starboard crew door as needed. The
port side of the helicopter was defended by a dedicated aerial gunner through a cabin window
behind the cockpit. The tail gunner provided suppressive fire for the rear sector of the helicopter,
along with a significant portion on either side, from the open rear ramp.
Figure 19. Nighttime rescue exercises using a hoist

The establishment of integrated crews, a
battle-proven concept since the days of World War
II, was practiced among the PAVE LOW
community and was proven to significantly
enhance their
combat
effectiveness and
survivability. The extremely low altitudes which
comprised the PAVE LOW’s primary operating
environment made situational awareness by all
crewmembers a critical element in mission
accomplishment, particularly since approximately 95% of all PAVE LOW missions were flown
at night. A true team effort became paramount when arriving at the rescue site and entering into a
hover or landing to retrieve personnel in total black-out conditions. While on-scene, the use of
night vision goggles by the crew was an absolute necessity to ensure visual awareness of ground
obstacles such as trees, rocks, electrical power lines or other hazards. During “brownout”
landings (where sand and dirt are recirculated by the main rotor rendering visibility severely
degraded) the verbal crew coordination among the co-pilot, flight engineer and crew was of
paramount importance to the pilot who carefully landed the aircraft. The role of the MH-53 in
the brownout problem is discussed in section 3.7.4.
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3.6

“PAVE LOW Leads”

While supporting various operations around the world throughout the 1980s, such as
Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989, PAVE LOW crews became very adept at their job and
were soon recognized throughout the military as some of the best in the business. Their
reputation as such made them and their aircraft
some of the most sought-after assets in the
U.S. military inventory. This accolade came to
the fore in 1991 when the PAVE LOW was
selected to lead the initial strike package into
Iraq to initiate Operation Desert Storm. In
order for coalition air forces to successfully
penetrate Iraqi air defenses and destroy key
targets with the best chances of success, it was
necessary to open a sizeable gap in the Iraqi
air defense radar network on the Iraqi/Saudi
Figure 20. MH-53J during Operation Desert Storm
Arabian border. Although the McDonnell
Douglas (now Boeing) AH-64A Apache attack
helicopter could bring plenty of firepower to bear
on the targets, it was not adequately equipped (at
the time) to accurately navigate the vast,
featureless desert terrain of Southwest Asia for
long distances. Therefore, it was decided that a
task force of Apaches would be led in tight
formation by a pair of MH-53Js using their highlyaccurate Global Positioning System (GPS) and INS
equipment. The unparalleled accuracy of the onboard systems allowed crews to arrive on-scene
within plus or minus 30 seconds of the scheduled
time. Acting as pathfinders, the PAVE LOW crews Figure 21. Combat rescue of downed Navy pilot
would drop chemical light sticks at pre-determined in Iraq—January 21, 1991
waypoints along the route to the target, allowing the Apache crews to update their on-board
Doppler navigation systems accordingly. In the early morning hours of January 17, the mission
took place exactly as planned with the Apaches reaching their objective and scoring direct hits
on the radar and communications sites, opening a 20-mile corridor for coalition strike aircraft.
The flawless execution of this critical mission played a pivotal role in the success of the war,
inspiring PAVE LOW crews to adopt the self-assured motto, “PAVE LOW Leads.”
After leading the very first mission of the 1991 Gulf War, the PAVE LOW performed
countless other missions, many of which remain shrouded in secrecy even today. Along with the
clandestine insertion and extraction of Special Operations Forces throughout the theater of
operations, the PAVE LOW also took part in some highly publicized operations, one of which
was the rescue of a downed U.S. Navy fighter pilot: the recovery of Lieutenant Devon Jones was
noteworthy not only for having been performed under enemy fire in broad daylight, but also for
being the first successful Air Force CSAR mission since the Vietnam War. Soon after the Gulf
War of 1991, PAVE LOW crews again found themselves in the forefront of regional conflict in
places such as Liberia, Haiti and various other locations. When war erupted in the Balkans in
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1995, PAVE LOWs were some of the first Air Force assets placed on alert as Operation
Deliberate Force commenced. A few years later, during Operation Allied Force, they were
involved in the high-profile rescue on March 28, 1999 of the pilot of a downed Lockheed
F-117A Nighthawk who evaded capture in Serbian-held territory for more than six tense hours.
Two months later, a PAVE LOW rescued the pilot of a downed Lockheed Martin F-16C
Fighting Falcon, evading heavy enemy fire for two hours in the process. Aside from performing
the traditional CSAR mission, PAVE LOWs carried out numerous Special operations missions in
support of troops operating deep behind enemy lines during operations in the Balkans.
3.7

PAVE LOW IV: The Last Generation

After a number of upgrades and improvements over the years, the PAVE LOW appeared
in its final variant as the MH-53M PAVE LOW IV. Initiated in 1997, the PAVE LOW IV
program aimed to provide the aircraft with enhanced threat detection and defensive capabilities
while providing crews with improved situational awareness of the battlefield. Modification of the
aircraft, twenty-five in total, took place between 1999 and 2001.The primary internal difference
in the Model was the addition of the Interactive Defensive Avionics System / Multi-mission
Advanced Tactical Terminal (IDAS/MATT). This advanced system provided crews with near
real-time intelligence and threat information from various off-board sensors, allowing them to
update their flight profile en route and more effectively avoid known air defenses.
A color, multifunctional, night-vision compatible digital map screen is the most visible
hardware in the IDAS/MATT. Located on the helicopter's instrument panel, the display gave an
MH-53 crew a clearer picture of the
battlefield. Crews were provided with access
to near real-time events, including the
aircraft’s flight route, man-made hazards such
as power lines, and even enemy electronic
threats that were "over-the-horizon." The
system
worked
by
coded
satellite
transmissions to the helicopter's computer that
were then decoded. The data from the screen
provided a perspective of potential threats and
their lethal threat radius. Besides the map
display, a navigational display provided digital
course and bearing information with the push
of a button. The heart of the system - advanced
Figure 22. MH-53M Pave Low IV deploys flares
software - included an integrated electronic
warfare system, infrared (IR) countermeasure
controls (including missile warning), radar warning and jammer inputs, as well as chaff and flare
countermeasures, all of which were monitored on one display. Crews received instant cautions
and advisories on threats with immediate recommendations, including when to dispense
countermeasures.
With IDAS/MATT, if the computer sensed a threat, it anticipated the threat with a direct
action the crew could take. It sensed the problem and offered the crew a way to solve it
instantaneously. The entire system was designed with the crew member as a priority in
consolidating a variety of functions. Special attention was made to display visible instrument
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panel functions with easy console access while increasing the efficient flow of information. In a
battlefield situation, concise and near real-time information is perhaps an aircrew's most valuable
asset. With IDAS/MATT, the probability of being detected by the enemy was greatly reduced.
The system was also readily transferred to other Special operations platforms and is included in
the CV-22B Osprey.
The IDAS/MATT upgrade program incorporated the PL IV aircraft system onto the PL
III simulation network. This upgrade made possible the software maintenance of the operational
flight programs of the MH-53M weapon system. With IDAS/MATT, the MH-53M was the
world's most software-intensive and technologically-sophisticated helicopter. Hardware changes
included updating the user interface function to reflect PL IV cockpit changes and the addition of
an Embedded Computer Systems Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) rack to host PL IV-unique
LRUs. Software changes included the modification of 10 existing LRU simulations. In addition,
the flight, visual scene driver, and terrain/target simulations were modified. Software block
cycle-change/cycle-time dramatically dropped with the Extendable Integration Support
Environment upgrade.
In the early spring of 2000, heavy, continuous rainfall in the southeast part of Africa
caused severe devastation and loss of life. Particularly hard hit was the country of Mozambique.
The WR-ALC/LU Directorate played a substantial supporting role in the relief efforts for that
Southeast African nation. On March 2, 2000, the DoD authorized U.S. military forces in Europe
to provide logistical and humanitarian relief support to the area through Operation Silent
Promise. The DoD also authorized the 352 SOG from RAF Mildenhall UK to deploy up to six
MH-53M helicopters for the relief effort. Only five were actually needed.
In FY02, WR-ALC employees upgraded two of the remaining MH-53Js to MH-53M
configuration with kits left over from the original IDAS/MATT program. At the end of FY02,
the fleet size stood at 11 MH-53Js and 25 MH-53Ms, due to two losses during Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF). Plans called for the remaining MH-53Js to be converted to MH-53M
configuration beginning with a FY03 new start in compliance with the PMD direction. Officials
also anticipated the fielding of a new MH-53M configuration calculated to correct system
obsolescence and vanishing vendor issues that exist with the currently fielded IDAS/MATT
equipment. Experts decided not to add any new capabilities. They expected these modifications
to correct existing production deficiencies. Once the new configuration was designed, tested, and
fielded on the 11 MH-53Js, the original 25 MH-53Ms would be upgraded in the out years to the
new common configuration. Upon program completion, HQ AFSOC would have a fleet of 36
operational aircraft in the same IDAS/MATT configuration.
3.7.1 MH-53M Mission Capable Rate
During recent years, all MH-53 stakeholders realized that the MH-53M Mission Capable
(MC) rate and Aircraft Availability rate were critical performance metrics for determining
whether HQ AFSOC and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) would have the fullyoperational aircraft available to meet National Command Authority (NCA) taskings. As such, the
SOF SPO, HQ AFSOC, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), depot repair organizations, and
suppliers had worked very hard with remarkable results that assured sustainment of outstanding
MC rates. From 1997 to 2000, the average MC rate increased from 56 percent to 80 percent.
However, this MH-53M MC rate and Aircraft Availability could not be maintained at that level
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without the funding of operational and sustainment modifications. Between 1999 and 2002, the
MH-53J/M fleet MC rate averaged 80 percent, with the highest monthly MC rate reaching 86.9
percent. Driven by the universal belief among the MH-53 work force that no detail was too
small, the MH-53M MC rate success had been attained through vigorous supply chain
management which employed thorough use of military supply sources, use of commercial
vendors, search of international markets, review of reclamation venues, and ingenious repair
efforts.
Just as the development of the entire prototype helicopter helped reduce cost and risk in
the MH-53 program, competitive prototyping of subsystems and components also helped reduce
risk and cost in the program. Nearly every subsystem added to the PL was prototyped and tested
at Hurlburt Field FL. These subsystems included radios, guns, navigation aids, etc. AFSOC
developed a formal test flight for the PL with AFOTEC (Air Force Operational Test and
Evaluation Center) as well as a DT&E (Developmental Test and Evaluation) group. They also
received outstanding support from both government and contractor repair facilities as well as the
hard working men and women on the flight lines and back shops at all Air Force PAVE LOW
operating locations.
In FY02, increased operations tempo (OPSTEMPO) invoked by OEF resulted in an
inordinate number of repairs. In some cases, this meant repairing gearboxes in just eight months,
a task which would normally be done in three years during peacetime. During FY02, pieces and
parts (gears, splines, bearings, gaskets, shafts, seals) for gearboxes were in short supply. These
gearboxes were last manufactured in quantity in the mid-1980s. Many of the piece part vendors
had gone out of business, while the MH-53M industrial base had shut down. Moreover, the
remaining Navy CH-53E vendors did not manufacture equipment suitable for the essentially
1960s-vintage MH-53M. The only way to get piece part vendors back into production again was
to place a substantial order. The SOF SPO recommended the order be for 41 complete sets of the
gearbox assemblies placed with Sikorsky Aircraft Inc. (United Technologies Corporation)
Headquarters in Stratford, Connecticut, the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM). The SOF
SPO concluded that once the piece part vendors resumed business operations, there would be
sources for piece part procurement to support future repair requirements.
3.7.2 AN/AAQ-24(V) Directed Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM)
The
AN/AAQ-24(V)
Directed
Infrared
Countermeasures (DIRCM) program was one of U.S.
Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM’s) highest
priority acquisition programs. This urgently-needed
aircraft self-protection suite provided fast and accurate
threat detection, processing, tracking, and countermeasures
to defeat current and future generation infrared missile
threats. DIRCM was designed for installation on a wide
range of rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft. For
USSOCOM, the system was installed on all of Air Force
Special Operations Command’s (AFSOC’s) AC–130
gunships and MC–130 Combat Talon aircraft. A laserFigure 23. AN/AAQ-24(V) DIRCM
based jamming capability was developed and shortly
thereafter installed on the MH-53M. Additionally,
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installation of the DIRCM system integrated a fully automatic mode to the chaff and flare
dispenser system to more effectively counter radar-directed and IR-based threats.
3.7.3

PLs Undergo Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) Enhancements
As a low-density/high-demand asset, the PAVE LOW was one of the most highly-tasked
platforms in the Air Force. In total, only 41 airframes received the PAVE LOW modification. Its
heavy use in all theaters of operation around the globe was taxing on the airframe. To maximize
its usefulness and longevity, the entire PAVE LOW inventory underwent a SLEP beginning in
the mid-1990s, receiving numerous upgrades and new components. The purpose of the MH-53
SLEP was to expand the operational gross weight capability and enhance the structural integrity
of the MH-53J PL III. The SLEP saw an increase in the gross weight (GW) from 42,000 to
50,000 lbs in order to provide a capable air vehicle beyond the year 2000. 7 CSAR operational
requirements were also addressed to meet the future DoD long-range helicopter needs. This
SLEP enhanced the ability of the MH-53J to deploy to extreme ranges at maximum GW which
allows for a limited number of weapon systems to be strategically based. Extensive airframe
modifications were also accomplished at the Naval Aviation Depot in Pensacola.
Key air vehicle elements of the MH-53J PL III SLEP, which included the addition of
Shipboard Operations (SBO) features, were:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Improved main rotor blades
Elastomeric main rotor head
T-64-GE-100 engines
Increased strength accessory gearbox support structure
Automatic tail pylon fold system for SBO
RH-53D main landing gear
Stronger alloy tail pylon skins
Structural enhancements in the aft fuselage upper/side skins
Improved/replaced aircraft electrical wiring system
New aircraft hydraulic tubing
Exhaust cooler for auxiliary power plant
Collective damper

The SLEP not only allowed the PAVE LOW to continue flying despite its considerable age,
but it also provided enhanced mission capabilities. Having seen its first major conflict during
Operation Allied Force in 1999, the PL IV again entered large-scale combat when the Global
War on Terror (GWOT) began at the start of OEF in Afghanistan in September 2001. Eighteen
months later, when the invasion of Iraq occurred in March 2003, the PAVE LOW was again at
the forefront of combat during OIF. Both of these conflicts were significant for their heavy
emphasis on Special operations, a task for which the PAVE LOW and its crews proved
immensely effective. As in previous conflicts, the PAVE LOW was often – not surprisingly –
one of the first assets present within a given theater of operations.
Effective systems engineering planning of the SLEP for the PAVE LOW program (1)
extended the usability of the weapon system into the 21st century which enabled it to play a
crucial role in the GWOT starting in 2001, and (2) allowed the PAVE LOW to remain viable
until its replacement, the CV-22B, could be fielded.
29

3.7.4 Beating Brownout on the PL IV
Between 1985 and 2005, the Air Force experienced Seven Class A (and B) mishaps in
their H-53 aircraft due to rotary-wing brownout (RWB). 8 Until recently, a Class A mishap was
defined as a mishap in which there was $1M or more in damage to the aircraft or death/
permanent total disability of the aircrew. A Class B mishap was a mishap with greater than
$200K but less than $1M in damages or a permanent partial disability to the aircrew. v
All of the U.S. armed services consider landings in dense, recirculating dust, sand, or
snow a hazard to helicopters and tilt-rotors. 9 The Office of the Under Secretary for Defense
Installations and Environment notes
brownout mishaps cost more than $100
million per year and accounted for a
third of all helicopter accidents in OEF
and OIF.
In 2006, the Air Force Research
Laboratory (AFRL) initiated a study
program directed at reducing or
eliminating the RWB problem. RWB is
the condition that results when a
helicopter lands in an arid environment
and the rotors recirculate sand and dust
such that visibility out of the cockpit is
severely reduced. The MH-53M
program figured prominently in the
RWB study. Four AFSOC aircrew
Figure 24. Onset of Rotary-Wing Brownout conditions
members were attending the Air Force
Institute of Technology (AFIT) in 2005-6 and were engaged in the study by then-Major Lee
Anderson (co-author of this Case Study). The foursome was able to develop the evaluation
criteria for the RWB technology developed during the study. Anderson and the others were able
to develop specific criteria for landing in degraded visual environments including brownout.
Blinding sand and dust clouds churned up by helicopter rotors still cost the U.S. armed services
lives and aircraft in ongoing conflicts. Since 2002, the Army alone has lost or damaged 27
helicopters in brownout mishaps. Recently, a Special Operations MH-47 Chinook hit a hidden
obstacle on takeoff and crashed, resulting in 10 fatalities.
The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps likewise have suffered losses operating at
unprepared sites in dense, recirculating dust.10 Better crew training and improved cockpit
symbology and flight controls have provided some help in addressing the common threat of
brownout. Singly, and in partnership, the services and the Defense Advanced Research Projects

v

Effective 1 October 2009 Class A: Total cost of damages in an amount of $2 million or more; or
destruction of a DoD aircraft; or injury/occupational illness resulting in fatality; or permanent total disability. Class
B: Total cost of damages in an amount of $500,000 or more, but less than $2 million; or injury/occupational illness
resulting in permanent partial disability; or hospitalization of three or more personnel as a result of a single accident.
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Agency (DARPA) meanwhile are pursuing advanced see-through, see-and-remember, and
combination technologies for safe landings in desert dust.
Cuing symbology also works with integrated flight controls to enhance stability in
brownout. The AFSOC upgraded MH-53M PL IV and HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopters with an
Altitude Hold Hover Stabilization system and improved cockpit symbology. Marine MV-22B
and Air Force CV-22B Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft have flight path vector displays that let crews
make brownout landings manually with cues on the hover indicator or automatically using the
fly-by-wire hover-hold function.
Hover symbology and enhanced flight controls nevertheless do nothing to avoid landing
zone (LZ) obstacles hidden by dust clouds. In 2006, AFRL tested the Photographic Landing
Augmentation System for Helicopters (PhLASH) on an MH-53M PL IV. Applied Minds Inc., of
Glendale, California, built a gimbaled, 16 mega-pixel camera with an IR strobe and laser
rangefinder to image the LZ before entering the cloud. The pilot saw a clear picture of the LZ as
it existed 20 to 30 seconds before landing, geo-registered on the real world with a GPS receiver
and inertial measurement unit. The see-and-remember PhLASH had the resolution to spot small
obstacles but could not show hazards entering the LZ after brownout occurred.11 The goal of the
AFRL RWB study was to develop a “see-through” capability.
AFRL brownout researchers concluded that laser radar (LADAR) could provide far better
spatial resolution than Millimeter Wave (MMW) radar to spot LZ obstacles. The 3D-LZ (ThreeDimensional Landing Zone) collaboration by AFRL and AFDD (AeroFlight Dynamics
Directorate at NASA Ames) integrated LADAR with an intuitive BrownOut Symbology System
(BOSS). The LADAR updated a dynamic navigation database that showed pilots color-enhanced
obstacles. BOSS cues developed by AFDD consolidated and improved elements of BSAU
(Brownout Situational Awareness Upgrade) symbology to give pilots essential flight parameters
with reduced workload. The 3D-LZ landings touched down at 0 to 1 knots, with descent rates
less than 50 feet per minute. Test pilot and AFDD flight projects office chief Lt Colonel Steve
Braddom noted, “They weren’t the typical aggressive landings you see in brownout.”
To provide a true multi-purpose helicopter sensor, AFRL researchers envision 3D-LZ
laser technology integrated with navigation FLIR. Sandblaster vi program managers, meanwhile,
consider Sandblaster “sensor-agnostic” and compatible with a mix of imaging technologies.
Additionally, DARPA is working with USSOCOM and Army aviation leaders to transition the
technology to a production brownout aid. The technology came along too late for the PL IV,
however, the PAVE LOW mission helped initiate the technology needed for the RWB system
which will be a valuable asset on other rotary-wing aircraft.

vi

Sandblaster is the program name given to a DARPA program whose goal was to reduce, if not eliminate, degraded
visual effects of brownout in helicopters.
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3.8

From the Battlefield to the “Boneyard”

Given adequate funding and no end in
sight for the PAVE LOW mission, the Air Force
had originally planned to retain the aircraft in
service possibly as late as 2014. However, the
inevitable rise in maintenance costs and the
increasing number of maintenance man-hours
required per flight hour to keep the PAVE LOW
flying took its toll. The MH-53M, like all
previous variants, was equipped with the vintage
radar and FLIR with which the PAVE LOW had
Figure 25. Final Pave Low mission—September 26, originally entered service, and lacked IR engine
exhaust suppressors. This resulted in not only
2008
having the highest maintenance requirements in
the entire AFSOC aircraft inventory, but it also posed a significant vulnerability to shoulder-fired
surface-to-air missiles. Additionally, ever-increasing reductions in funding meant that the PL IV
program turned out to be the last major upgrade of the type. Even as the first MH-53J was retired
on January 4, 2007, the PAVE LOW remained a highly effective, fully mission-capable platform
with no operational flight restrictions, and the airframe had no structural fatigue problems. Even
as late as June 2008, PAVE LOW crews were engaged in low-level flight training in the
mountains and valleys surrounding Roanoke, Virginia. The final operational combat mission for
the PAVE LOW took place on September 26, 2008, during a logistical resupply and passenger
movement mission supporting Special Operations Forces in central and southern Iraq as part of
OIF, bringing an end to a distinguished career of nearly 30 years. Fittingly, the mission took
place under the cover of total darkness.
Like many before them, most of the
last PAVE LOWs to see action were
transported directly from the theater of
operations
to
the
309th
Aerospace
Maintenance and Regeneration Group (309
AMARG), affectionately known as the
“Boneyard,” adjacent to Davis-Monthan AFB,
Arizona. Those that were not taken to the
Boneyard found their way to museums around
the country, ensuring their place in history as a
symbol of freedom and the heroes they
supported. As the drawdown of the PAVE
LOW occurred, some units chose to
Figure 26. Retired Pave Low in outdoor storage at
commemorate the service of this remarkable
Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ
aircraft with formal ceremonies honoring the
th
type. One of those, the 20 Special Operations Squadron (20 SOS), held the distinctive honor of
being the last unit to operate the PAVE LOW. A formal retirement ceremony, attended by scores
of military and civilian guests, was held on October 17, 2008, at Hurlburt Field, Florida. Pilots,
aircrew members, maintainers and various others who were involved with the PAVE LOW at
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one time or another all gathered to bid a fond farewell to the machine they knew and admired. In
the Hurlburt Field Air Park, an MH-53M now sits immortalized on permanent display.

Figure 27. Formal PAVE LOW retirement ceremony—October 17, 2008
Figure 28. Bell Boeing CV-22B Osprey tilt-rotor

As the decision was made to retire the PAVE
LOW and the type was gradually withdrawn from
service, the Air Force endeavored to introduce the
Bell Boeing CV-22B Osprey tilt-rotor into full
operational service as a partial replacement for the
PAVE LOW. While the Osprey’s superior speed and
range
allow
it
to
perform
long-range
infiltration/exfiltration and resupply, differences in
flight profile, performance, and capability as compared to the PAVE LOW have not allowed it to
fill completely the void left behind by the MH-53J/M. Instead, the remainder of the PAVE LOW
mission is now carried out by Army Special Operations helicopters such as the Boeing MH47E/G Chinook.

Figure 29. Boeing MH-47E Chinook (Special Operations Variant)
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4

Conclusion

The Sikorsky MH-53 PAVE LOW III helicopters were originally HH-53B/C Super Jolly
Green Giants, or “Super Jollies,” used by the U.S. Air Force in the Vietnam War. The
requirement to perform combat rescue missions during periods of darkness before the
introduction of night vision technology drove several attempts to modify the H-53. After several
unsuccessful attempts, the PAVE LOW III program successfully developed an effective design
which included advanced inertial and Doppler navigation systems, a Forward-Looking Infrared
(FLIR) sensor, automated hover stabilization and Terrain-Following/Terrain-Avoidance (TF/TA)
radar. Eight operational HH-53C aircraft were modified and became known as the HH-53H
PAVE LOW III capable of flying low level missions at night and in adverse weather. The
success of this program eventually led to the evolution of all 41 HH-53 aircraft in the USAF to
the MH-53J PAVE LOW III enhanced configuration. These aircraft were designated for Special
operations and were subsequently given Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation systems,
improved engines and rotor blades as well as structural reinforcement to extend the life of the
airframes and increase the maximum operating weights during the 1980s. The MH-53J became
famous during Desert Storm when used to lead AH-64 aircraft to conduct initial strikes against
Iraqi surface to air missile systems and enable to start of the air war. During the late 1990s the
aircraft received another major upgrade to the avionics including improved defensive systems
integration, a color digital map display and a satellite intelligence receiver to improve situational
awareness and survivability. These modified aircraft were now designated MH-53M and were
informally known as PAVE LOW IV and first saw combat employment in Kosovo. Throughout
its lifespan, Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) employed the PAVE LOW to
conduct long-range, low-level insertion, extraction and resupply of Special Operations Forces
(SOF) from all branches of the US military.
An effective systems engineering plan for system modifications and upgrades via the
SLEP extended the life of the aircraft while enhancing its usability. Originally designed for a
10-year service life, some of the modified H-53 aircraft had tail numbers ranging from 66 (built
in 1966) to the early 70s. The PAVE LOW SLEP helped keep the weapon system viable for an
additional 15-20 years with final retirement in 2008.
Indisputably, the PAVE LOW
established a solid and well-deserved
reputation
for
performance
and
reliability among its crews and
maintainers. Its high mission-ready rate
was a testament not only to the
hardworking maintenance crews, but
also to the sheer ruggedness of the H-53
airframe. Having performed countless
clandestine military operations across
Figure 30.Overwater flight of an MH-53M at dusk
the globe, ranging from the small-scale
conflicts of the 1980s to the recent
liberation of Iraq and the ongoing campaign in Afghanistan, the PAVE LOW will be
remembered as a true warrior. The “cloak-and-dagger” nature of Special operations dictates that
many of the missions undertaken by the PAVE LOW and her valiant crews will remain shrouded
in secrecy for years to come. Eventually, when these missions are one day made public, the true
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valor and bravery inherent in the PAVE LOW community will be revealed. In addition to its
secretive wartime role, the PAVE LOW provided valuable assistance in peacetime disaster relief
and humanitarian support missions in numerous places around the world. In the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, PAVE LOWs provided airlift for equipment, supplies and personnel in the
massive relief effort. A case in point, less than one month prior to retirement, a PAVE LOW was
placed on standby in September 2008 to assist the U.S. Coast Guard on a mission to rescue the
crew of a Cyprus flagged freighter adrift in the Gulf of Mexico in the midst of Hurricane Ike.
Despite being a conversion of an existing platform rather than one built for the mission from the
ground up, the PAVE LOW had no peer in nighttime low-level penetration capability. The
PAVE LOW was viewed by many as the premier CSAR and Special operations helicopter, a
sentiment enthusiastically shared by virtually all who flew it. Indeed, many crewmembers, both
newcomers and seasoned veterans, have proclaimed that the PAVE LOW was – and will remain
– the absolute peak of their career. Even in retirement, the PAVE LOW leaves behind a legacy as
the largest, most powerful and most technologically advanced helicopter ever to fly in the Air
Force inventory. In the words of Lieutenant Colonel Gene Becker, Commander of the 20th
Expeditionary Special Operations Squadron (20 ESOS) in Iraq which flew the final PAVE LOW
combat mission, “She goes out, as she came in – the very best.”

Figure 31. MH-53M PAVE LOW IV, National Museum of the U.S. Air Force, Dayton, Ohio
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Appendix A A Framework of Key Systems Engineering Concepts and Responsibilities
Concept Domain

Responsibility Domain
1. Contractor Responsibility 2. Shared Responsibility

3. Government Responsibility

A. Requirements Definition
and Management
B. Systems Architecting and
Conceptual Design
C. System and Subsystem
Detailed Design and
Implementation
D. Systems and Interface
Integration

E. Validation and Verification

F. Deployment and Post
Deployment
G. Life Cycle Support

H. Risk Assessment and
Management
I. System and Program
Management

This Friedman-Sage matrix is included as an exercise for the student. Following the explanation
in Section 1.5 of this Case Study develop 4-6 systems engineering learning principles from the case study
and then insert them into the matrix based on whether they were a contractor responsibility, a government
responsibility, or a shared responsibility between the government and the contractor.
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William Albery, Ph.D. is the Chief Scientist of Innovative Technologies Corporation (ITC) in
Dayton, Ohio. He is a retired 36-year civilian (U.S. Air Force) who technically managed the
Wright Patterson AFB human centrifuge facility. From 2005-2008, he was the Crew Interface
Systems Engineer on the Air Force Research Laboratory’s Rotary-Wing Brownout (RWB) study.
In 2007, he organized and now leads a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) RTO Task
Group on RWB that has 9 countries and 20 scientists/engineers and pilots participating. He
received his Bachelor’s of Science degree in Systems Engineering from Wright State University
(WSU) in 1971, his Master's Degree in Biomedical Engineering from The Ohio State University
(OSU) in 1976, and his Doctorate (PhD) in Biomedical Sciences from WSU in 1987. He is an
Associate Professor in the WSU School of Medicine, a Fellow of the Aerospace Medical
Association, a Fellow of the Aerospace Human Factors Association, and past President of the
SAFE Association. Dr. Albery was a co-author for the AFIT MQ-1/9 Case Study and the author
of a Case Study for the C-17. He is co-PI on the MH-53J/M Case Study and the PI on the E-10
Case Study, also for the AFIT Center for Systems Engineering.
Raymond L. Robb grew up in Savannah, Georgia, where he developed a passion for aviation at
an early age. Living in the shadow of Hunter Army Airfield, he was accustomed to frequent
overflights of military aircraft of all types, a contributing factor to his decision to join the United
States Air Force. While on active duty, he served for a number of years at Royal Air Force
Mildenhall in the United Kingdom, followed by an assignment at Regional Headquarters Allied
Forces North Europe in Brunssum, the Netherlands. Upon completion of nearly ten years of
service, he left the Air Force with an Honorable Discharge for a position at the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in Arlington, Virginia. From there, he later
relocated to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, where he supported numerous
programs as a Contractor within the Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) prior to becoming an
Air Force Civilian. In this capacity, he currently works in the Air Force Research Laboratory
(AFRL) under Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) at Wright-Patterson AFB. Outside of
work, he continues to be an avid aviation enthusiast, photographer, and historian. His continued
interest in the preservation of aviation history serves him well in his position as President of the
Dayton Chapter of the American Helicopter Society (AHS). In addition, he is a freelance writer
and Contributing Editor for Vertiflite magazine. His articles and photos have appeared in a
number of publications read worldwide. He currently works in the Materials & Manufacturing
Directorate of AFRL. He is an avid aviation enthusiast, photographer, and historian. His article,
Darkness Falls: A Farewell to the PAVE LOW (Vertiflite, Winter 2008, Vol. 54, No. 4), was the
basis for the narrative of this Case Study.
Lt Col Lee Anderson is a 1992 Air Force Academy graduate (Aeronautical Engineering) as
well as a 2006 AFIT Systems Engineering graduate. Lieutenant Colonel Leighton “Lee”
Anderson is Commander of the 1st Special Operations Support Squadron, Hurlburt Field,
Florida. He directs a squadron with over 400 officer and enlisted personnel who are charged
with a myriad of flying operations support functions. Mission include air traffic control,
airfield management, combat medicine, intelligence, weather, current operations, aircrew
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training, range support, aircrew life support, and joint liaisons. Lieutenant Colonel Anderson
earned his commission upon graduation from the United States Air Force Academy in 1992.
He completed Undergraduate Pilot Training in 1993 and has served as an instructor and
evaluator pilot. He is a senior pilot with over 3,000 flying hours in the UH-1N, MH-53J/M,
C-12 and V-22 with combat experience in Operations ALLIED FORCE, SOUTHERN
WATCH, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM. Selected as initial cadre for the
CV-22, he has extensive experience developing, testing, and fielding advanced solutions to
improve combat effectiveness for Special operations vertical lift aircraft. Anderson was a
member of the AFRL Rotary-Wing Brownout (RWB) Integrated Study Team from 20062008. He and his AFIT colleagues developed the Systems Engineering Plan for the AFRL
Integrated RWB study and helped define the criteria for performing safe landings in
Degraded Visual Environments.
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Appendix C: 1970 ROC
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Appendix D: 1974 PMD
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Appendix E: AN/APQ-158 TF/TA Radar
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Appendix F: PMD 1977
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